by Jo Wilding

Headmaster Mohammed looked out at the horde of kids outside the school gate and mused that quite a lot of them might come back now they’d seen the circus. They wouldn’t want to miss it if it came back again, he said. Loads of kids dropped out because of poverty in the family, the dangers and difficulties of getting to school or the poor conditions of the school itself. Kids from other schools have been kidnapped for money or attackers have come into the school. There’s nothing to keep anyone out, Mohammed said, looking at the feeble gates.

Part of Mohammed’s problem is the lack of text books. They’re still working with the old ones, with Saddam’s picture in them and they haven’t got nearly enough for all the kids, so the teachers can only lecture. Unicef was close to giving contracts for the printing of new books to local Iraqi printers, who had started buying the inks and materials, before Unicef pulled out leaving nothing but ill-feeling between the different companies.

They’ve got no other teaching materials at all. There are a thousand boys in the morning shift and a thousand girls in the evening shift so there’s no time or space for any sort of training for the 30 teachers. Each child is allocated twelve pencils per year, an average of one and a half per month of school. “But the children do not keep a pencil for a month. They keep a pencil for a few days and then it is broken or lost or finished.” It goes without saying that there are no art materials in the school.

Phyllis Bennis
Institute for Policy Studies
16 March 2004 - Anniversary of the Murder of Rachel Corrie

The signing of the interim Iraqi “constitution” by the Governing Council represents a significant step in U.S. efforts to legitimize its invasion and occupation of Iraq. By achieving the codification in a U.S.-supervised process of an ostensibly “Iraqi” legal document, the U.S. as occupying power is hoping that its planned June 30th “transfer of power” will be accepted globally as the “restoration of sovereignty to Iraq.” In fact, that “transfer of power” will not end the U.S. occupation, will not lead to the withdrawal of U.S. troops, and will not result in any real sovereignty for Iraq. The constitution itself implies recognition of its impotence, as it recognizes that all “laws, regulations, orders, and directives” issued by the U.S. occupation authorities will remain in force.

The new Iraqi constitution lacks legitimacy. It was drafted under U.S. supervision by a body hand-chosen by the U.S. military occupation authorities, and subject to final approval by the U.S. proconsul, Paul Bremer. Its acceptance by the Iraqi population remains uncertain; its ability to actually set the terms for laws to govern the country during the interim period after June 30 remains unknown; its relevance to any truly independent government created after the interim period remains in doubt. As a result, any examination of the Constitution must include its legitimacy/illegitimacy, as well as the content of its provisions.

The constitution describes only a vague process to select the new transitional government to which the U.S. will “transfer power” on June 30th. It is to be chosen through “a process of extensive deliberations and consultations with cross-sections of the Iraqi people conducted by the Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority and possibly in consultation with the United Nations.” No method of conducting such “extensive deliberations” is included, and given the Governing Council’s failure so far to have engaged in serious wide-ranging consultations with Iraqi society regarding their own governance, it is unlikely to change any time soon. Crucially, the mandated “consultations” are to be conducted equally between the existing U.S.-appointed Governing Council and the U.S. occupation authority itself - thus insuring that the Governing Council will remain either fully in place or with a self-selected successor body to replace it. The role of the UN is dismissed as “perhaps” being included in consultations.

The Iraq Governing Council holds on to power. Since the constitution says nothing about how the interim government will actually be selected, the unspoken understanding is that the Governing Council -perhaps enlarged by additional U.S.-selected individuals, perhaps in its current form-will remain the center of Iraqi authority. Many current members of the Council have made clear their desire to hold on to power, knowing that (since most of them spent the last decade or two or three outside of Iraq) they would be unlikely to win any kind of election. As a result, the United Nations and others have suggested that the interim government operate with a very narrow mandate - essentially “keeping the lights on and paying the bills of the street-sweepers.” Specifically, the suggestion was that the interim government make no decisions regarding major economic or foreign policy issues. However, the constitution as drafted provides no limits on what issues the interim government, in whatever form it takes, may decide - including continuing the U.S.-initiated privatization policies, negotiating major replacement oil contracts, and most significantly signing a Status of Forces Agreement with the U.S. to provide an Iraqi “invitation” to the 100,000+ U.S. troops who will remain in Iraq.