Christian Peacemaker Teams, Iraq

Introduction
Between May 31 and December 20, 2003, Christian Peacemaker Teams (C.P.T.) in Iraq conducted dozens of interviews of Iraqi detainees and/or their families and support networks. From these findings, C.P.T. published a report in January 2004 on 72 detainees, with recommendations to the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).

Between December 20, 2003 and August 31, 2004, C.P.T. continued to follow the condition of the detainee situation by taking testimonies of released detainees and by ongoing contact with the families of persons still detained. C.P.T. also interviewed many more detainees and families who contacted C.P.T. for assistance. In July 2004, C.P.T. published a situation report on the detainee issue based on these interviews and conversations.

This report includes a review of the current situation of the detainees in Iraq, according to C.P.T.’s unique investigations (Section I), a follow-up of the original 72 cases reported on in January 2004 (Section II), and a selection of testimonies from released detainees (Section III). This report also includes appendices providing contextual information for the detention system in Iraq (Appendix I) and background on the work of C.P.T. in Iraq (Appendix II).

C.P.T. intends this report to be used primarily as a source of information about detainees in Iraq. C.P.T. will disseminate it to military and civil authorities in Iraq, U.N. officials, legislators and other policy-makers in the U.S., international media, Iraqi non-government organizations (NGOs), other international NGOs, church groups in North America, human rights organizations, and to the general public from C.P.T.’s website (www.cpt.org). In accordance with its organizational mandate, C.P.T. desires that this report will produce movements toward justice and peace in Iraq.

Section I: Situation Report on Detainees

BACKGROUND

Christian Peacemaker Teams’ (C.P.T.’s) January 2004 report on 72 Iraqi detainee cases outlined a number of problematic trends in the Coalition Forces’ (CF’s) detention system in Iraq, as follows:

• House raids using excessive force, often against unarmed civilians and often based on bad information
• Theft and destruction of personal property at the time of capture, especially in house raids
• Detentions without explanation, formal charges, access to legal counsel, or an appropriate judicial process
• Mistreatment and deliberate abuse of detainees in U.S. military facilities
• Inadequate living conditions in detention facilities
• Ineffective processes for retrieving confiscated property
• Inadequate communication of information about detainees to their families
• Lack or great difficulty of visitations between detainees and their families

C.P.T.’s conclusion in the January report was that the military actions designed to ensure short-term security were in fact compromising long-term security interests of Iraqis and all internationals, including the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). C.P.T. further expressed particular concern that any mistreatment of the Iraqi people could lead to long-term problems, including:

• Increasing numbers of Iraqi people joining resistance groups
• Increasing danger of attacks against Coalition soldiers
• A growing record of human rights violations against the Iraqi people

C.P.T.’s July 2004 situation report on Iraqi detainees reiterated these concerns. The July report also outlined a number of observations about security detainees in Iraq at the time, based on testimonies C.P.T. members took after January 2004. They are as follows:

• The CF or Iraqi Ministry of Justice frequently released criminal detainees after short periods, while security detainees remained detained for extended periods with no legal proceedings.
• The Multinational Force (MNF) continued to use house raids as a main way of capturing suspected insurgents, often based on tips from informants, and often using excessive force.
• Since May 2004, detainee visitations at the Abu Ghraib detention facility have improved, becoming easier to schedule and available more frequently.
• Families still had trouble receiving accurate information about the well being of their detained loved ones. In addition, some released detainees reported inadequate medical treatment.
• Released detainees reported that abuse often occurred in various forms and in various locales, the most frequent locale being the first place the CF/MNF soldiers took them after capture (usually a local military base). They also continued to report overcrowded conditions, poor food and water, and inadequate clothing and bedding supplies in detention facilities.
• Iraqis reported a continuing trend of MNF soldiers confiscating personal property and money as they took detainees into custody. As of July, C.P.T. was not aware of even one instance in which the CF/MNF gave a receipt (as is required) for goods or money confiscated.
• Mid-spring 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) made more information about detainees available (in Arabic) via the Internet and through the Iraqi Assistance Center (IAC) and several General Information Centers (GICs). Information at these centers varied from center to center, however, and they sometimes gave families wrong information.
• Many released detainees and their families expressed particular bitterness that the United States, a country that speaks of bringing democracy to Iraq, did not follow democratic principles of justice by allowing them due legal process.

From these observations, C.P.T. concluded that a transparent and efficient process for handling detainee issues, including full legal rights and representation for detainees, was not fully in place at the time. C.P.T. thus continued to urge the U.S.-led MNF that remains in charge of much of the Iraqi prison system to work towards full human rights for detainees and their families through a just and humane process in apprehension of suspects and their subsequent detention.

THE PRESENT SITUATION

The reports of abuse at Abu Ghraib prison and other detention camps in Iraq that surfaced in April 2004 and continue to the present have affected both the detention system and the feeling of Iraqis about the conduct and behavior of the MNF in civil society. There is a general feeling of broken trust among Iraqis towards the MNF, and an element of distance between them. However, common Iraqis have continued to play an important role in assisting the MNF in security measures by offering warnings and information when they observe suspicious persons or activity.

Reports C.P.T. has taken from released detainees indicate trends of more widespread problems and abuse than the media brought to light on Abu Ghraib in April 2004. C.P.T.’s information from released detainees indicates abuse and mistreatment were not limited to Abu Ghraib. Released detainees also reported abuse and mistreatment at the Camp Bucca in Um Qasr and Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), as well as at many of the initial intake facilities for prisoners, including local MNF military bases.

However, in discussions with the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights, detainees, families of persons still detained, and the MNF, C.P.T. has learned that there have been positive changes made to the system since C.P.T. began its work with detainees in June 2003. Families can now obtain visits more easily and with higher frequency than in the past. Released detainees reported improvements to living conditions. Information regarding detainees’ whereabouts has been more widely available to families through the IAC, GICs (facilities under the auspice of the MNF), and the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights. Another positive change is in the review process for security detainees. In August 2004, the procedure changed from review by a three-member panel consisting of senior MNF officers to the nine-member Combined Review and Release Board (CRRB). The board has made it a goal to increase the frequency of review for each security detainee from once every six months to once every three months. (See Appendix I.)

However, some of the new Iraqi members of the CRRB have expressed concerns about the board and its operating procedures. The largest concern is that the final approval for all releases rests with the MNF’s Deputy Commanding General for Detainee Operations, Major General Geoffrey Miller. Another concern is that there is ambiguity about the possible outcomes for a security detainee through the CRRB. The options appear to be release, release with a guarantor, referral to the Iraqi criminal court system, or continued detention by the MNF. While the first three options are straightforward, the fourth is not. Iraqis fear that detainees could continue to remain in the custody of the MNF indefinitely, given the veto power of MG Miller.

Furthermore, the creation of the CRRB does not change the fact that the Interim Government of Iraq (IGI) and the MNF are in standing violation of international law regarding detainees. Before the transfer of sovereignty to the IGI, the Coalition was the formal Occupying Power of Iraq, and thus bound by the Geneva Conventions. The CF cited Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention as grounds for holding security detainees. The Geneva Conventions in general allow significant leeway for actions an Occupying Power can take for reasons of security.

However, with the transfer of sovereignty on June 28, 2004, the Coalition’s occupation of Iraq formally ended, meaning that the Geneva Conventions are no longer the guiding regulations for the detention system in Iraq. Instead, several other international law documents apply, including Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, and Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. Among other things, these laws require the MNF to release all detainees in Iraq as of June 30, 2004-or at the very least, to clarify the legal status of any detainees the MNF continues to hold and explain why it still holds them.

According to the above international laws, the IGI may hold security detainees captured before June 30, 2004 if and only if the IGI issues them formal charges according to law codes that are in good standing with international law. In addition, among other things, the IGI must allow legal counsel for all detainees and process them swiftly through a judicial system that meets the standards set forth by international law.

By the above international laws, the IGI may relinquish control over some of its detainees to another body, if and only if that body adopts the formal charges issued by the IGI or itself issues charges in accord with Iraqi or international law codes, allows legal counsel for all detainees, institutes an appropriate judicial system and processes detainees through it swiftly, and adheres to all other relevant international laws. Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi authorized the MNF to detain persons in Iraq where they deem it necessary for imperative reasons of security. Although this language was taken from the Fourth Geneva Convention, PM Allawi’s edict does not ascribe to the MNF other privileges or responsibilities of an Occupying Power provided by the Geneva Conventions (such as holding security detainees indefinitely and without charges).

In other words, nothing gives the MNF or the IGI license to violate any relevant international law. Nevertheless, both the MNF and the IGI remain in standing violation of several international laws, citing their agreements at the transfer of sovereignty as justification for their present actions. The MNF has publicly announced that 700 of 5,300 detainees they hold are now subject to criminal charges and will be processed by the Central Criminal Court of Iraq. They stated that the CRRB has already reviewed 300 detainees, but did not state their decision on them. They further stated that the CRRB plans to review an additional 3,700 "eligible" security detainees. That leaves at least 4,600 detainees in legal limbo, 600 of which the MNF has no stated intention to even review.1

The MNF needs to improve its detention system in other areas as well. Although the MNF made it easier for families of detainees to visit, the visits are still limited to one adult family member and one child per visit. This places a hardship on families with a family member or members detained far from home. In addition, the current security situation and difficulty in travel limits the visitation possibilities for some families.

Families also express concern regarding detained family members who are elderly or infirm. The MNF detains some such persons for many months and their condition often deteriorates at a more rapid rate due to the stress of being away from home and family. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) does evaluate the medical condition of detainees during their prison visits, and if they observe a prisoner who appears to be in ill health they may ask for expedited review for release. However, C.P.T. has seen no way for families to request such a review if they observe a deteriorating medical condition in their family member.

The GICs make information regarding prisoners more widely available, yet, after conducting an experiment on the availability, consistency and quality of information given at these facilities, C.P.T. discovered large discrepancies between these facilities’ information-both in accuracy and in timeliness. In addition, these centers are often difficult to locate, which limits the true availability of the information to Iraqi families. At one of the GICs C.P.T. visited, staff noted that they purposely allowed their facility to remain unmarked, as they feel it is dangerous to be known to be working with MNF.

Iraqis still have great difficulty obtaining compensation for goods and money taken during arrest. C.P.T. has not found even one instance where the CF/MNF gave a receipt for items taken at the time of arrest. Placing a claim for compensation becomes next to impossible for Iraqis when they have no proof of ownership of the items taken. In addition, compensation for medical injuries and wrongful death are rare, and Iraqis often give up on their claims citing tedious procedures and frustration with repeated requests for information from the MNF.

Iraqis have also expressed to C.P.T. a deep concern regarding detainees who seem to have disappeared within the detention system. C.P.T. has been involved in a number of cases where the detainee was known to be detained by the CF/MNF but was not shown as being registered in any of the facilities. C.P.T. has learned that some detainees whose names do not show on the database through the IAC or GICs are on a "black list" of detainees thought to be higher security risks.

Families have also raised the concern that there are detainees held in facilities outside of Iraq, including such places as Qatar, Kuwait and Germany. Members of the Iraqi police who work as interrogators within the MNF detention system and the Iraqi Red Crescent Society have both expressed concern about this issue. C.P.T. is concerned that these detainees fall outside of the normal scope of accountability procedures.

In addition to all of the aforementioned concerns regarding the detainee situation, C.P.T. has noted that detentions have many social and economic repercussions. Families are separated for long periods. In many families the major breadwinner of the family has been detained, sometimes for many months. This leaves families without income or resources to support themselves. One man said, "Believe me, there are people starving because of this."

There is a great deal of frustration among detainees and their families over detentions when there is little information about the charges that keep them detained. Detainees have often said they did not know why they were detained, nor why they were released. (C.P.T. has noted on the detainee database managed by the MNF that some detainees were listed without charges, and others were listed with very vague charges, such as "bad father.") These lengthy and often questionable detentions have caused many hardships for Iraqi families.

C.P.T.’s primary concerns about the MNF’s detention system in Iraq at present can be summarized as follows:

• Released detainees continue to report abuses in a variety of CF/MNF facilities, even after the CF/MNF took action to correct problems in Abu Ghraib in April 2004.
• U.S. military commanders still have final authority on the fate of all security detainees.
• The MNF and IGI are in standing violation of several regulations under international humanitarian law for about 5,000 detainees in Iraq.
• Families of detainees still find it very difficult to visit, or even to get information regarding their detained relatives.
• Elderly and infirm detainees suffer deteriorating health conditions while in MNF custody.
• Detainees continue to report that they did not receive receipts for confiscated items and thus have had great difficulty in retrieving their property or making compensation claims after the CF/MNF released them.
• The MNF limits information on detainees such that some families cannot confirm the detention of relatives they have reason to believe were captured. The MNF may be hiding certain detainees deliberately.
• Families suffer economic and emotional hardships from prolonged detention, especially when the MNF gives no reason for it. This feeds resentment against the MNF.

A just and humane detention system is essential to a free and democratic Iraq. C.P.T. praises the improvements the CF/MNF have made since January 2004, and urges the MNF to move to improve on the above concerns immediately.

Section II: Follow-Up of 72 Detainees

C.P.T. has tried to follow up with each of the original 72 detainee cases included in the January report. C.P.T. members have often had difficulty locating released detainees and/or the families of persons still detained. At the time of most of the original interviews, there was no working telephone system in Iraq. Iraqis often made contact with C.P.T. by coming to C.P.T.’s office in Baghdad and not all of them left contact information. While some of these persons have continued their relationship with C.P.T., many have not for various reasons.

The status of the original 72 cases as of the end of August 2004 is as follows:

• 48 have been released
• 1 is still detained
• 1 is known to have died while in the custody of the CF/MNF
• The whereabouts of 11 detainees are unknown within the detention system although it has been reasonably confirmed that they were indeed detained by the CF/MNF
• The whereabouts of 1 detainee not confirmed as detained by the CF/MNF are unknown
• There are 10 detainees with whom C.P.T. was unable to follow up

C.P.T. was able to obtain testimonies from a number of the released detainees and found a variety of experiences among them. There was a strong trend of fear of reprisal from the MNF for testifying publicly about their experiences among detainees released since the completion of the January 2004 report. Some declined to give their testimony at all, others agreed to give their testimony only if C.P.T. did not circulate it, and others gave C.P.T. permission to publicize their testimonies only if their names were withheld.

Rather than a statistical report of detainees’ experiences, as was included in C.P.T.’s January report, this report includes two new detailed testimonies from the 72 detainees C.P.T. has followed, and one additional testimony of a released detainee who was not part of the original 72 cases. His testimony is included because of the compelling nature of his story.

Section III: Testimonies

The following testimonies (numbered 1, 2 and 3) are selected examples of detainees’ various experiences in the detention system. They are evidence of trends C.P.T. has discovered through testimonies of these and other released detainees. (See Section I.)

C.P.T. has no concrete way to verify the claims of released detainees. However, C.P.T. members documented the testimonies carefully and screened out persons they had reason to believe fabricated or exaggerated information. The following testimonies demonstrate how independent detainees’ claims corroborate.

Only the first man, Najeeb Abbas Al-Shami, agreed to allow C.P.T. to use his real name in this report. He is also the only released detainee who was not included in the original 72 cases.

1. Testimony of Najeeb Abbas Al-Shami

Mr. Najeeb is 59 years old. In 2003, after the fall of Saddam, he worked for the then-governor of Kerbala. Mr. Najeeb said the governor at the time was illegally selling government cars that were looted. His name was Jamal al-Wakeem, and he was associated with the Islamic Wafak Movement. On Thursday, May 15, the governor asked him to visit Ayatollah Sistani’s office to handle a problem. (The problem concerned conflicts between Iraqi tribes and Iranians who had recently moved back to the area of Al Kut and wanted to reclaim lands seized by Iraq during the Iran-Iraq conflict.) When Mr. Najeeb returned to the governor’s office from the meeting, two U.S. intelligence officers were waiting for him and wanted to ask him questions. Mr. Najeeb said they called themselves Brown and David. They took him into the parking lot where they frisked him in public. They tied his hands behind his back, put him in their humvee and drove him to Camp Lima, in the Ibrahimiyah area.

At Lima, three soldiers questioned Mr. Najeeb. They claimed he was a Ba’athist and a spy. They claimed he was an Islamic militant. They also claimed his assistant was Qasim Mohammed Musleh, who served under Saddam. They said they had documents but they did not show them to him. They threatened to arrest him if he did not give these people over to the Coalition Forces. Mr. Najeeb said he did not know any of the people they mentioned. The soldiers then arrested him. They laid him face down on the ground, stepped on his head and tied his hands behind his back.

Brown gave several soldiers orders to watch over Mr. Najeeb, and ordered them not to give him anything to eat for 48 hours. Mr. Najeeb said the soldiers "had a party" to make fun of him. One soldier put his foot on his head. Another taped stuffed animals to him and took pictures. They kicked him in the back and the back of the neck, and spit in his face. Whenever Mr. Najeeb asked for water, soldiers would pour it over his head. Only two soldiers there helped him drink normally. Once when Mr. Najeeb asked for water, one soldier pulled his own pants down and put his penis in Mr. Najeeb’s mouth, and said, "You can drink now." The soldier then passed gas in Mr. Najeeb’s face. Soldiers then pulled Mr. Najeeb’s pants down, exposing him, and yelled the word "feekie" repeatedly. Soldiers continued to beat him and told him they would take him to Guantanamo Bay detention facility the next day.

At 5:00 am, soldiers took Mr. Najeeb to the base at Kerbala University. A doctor there named Garrett took off his plastic ties and massaged the blood back into his wrists. "He treated me like a human being," Mr. Najeeb said. The doctor gave him cigarettes and water but said he could not give him food.

On Friday, May 16, 2003, soldiers drove him to a U.S. base in the Al Diwaniah province about 120 kilometers from Kerbala. At the base, he waited in the truck in the sun from 1:00 pm to 5:00 pm. He told them that he suffered from angina and needed medication, but a female doctor told him they did not have any angina medication.

Soldiers then tied Mr. Najeeb’s hands and feet together and put him in the back of a truck, driving further south to a U.S. base in Nasiriyah. When they removed him from the truck he was so weak and exhausted that he could not stand. Two soldiers helped him and took him to a camp. He spent three days in that camp before they moved him to Camp Bucca.

At Bucca, he said he was taken to something called the CID, which he identified as an investigation office. The prison guards kept him in a large tent with many other prisoners and two guards. The prisoners were not allowed to talk to each other; they could only speak when they prayed. If they had to use the bathroom, guards placed them in handcuffs and escorted them. Sometimes the soldier escorting them was a woman. The prisoners ate two meals per day in the 50-degree-Celsius [125-degree-Fahrenheit] sun outside their tents. If a prisoner felt too ill from the heat to eat, he was allowed to go back into the tent, but he could not eat later. During Mr. Najeeb’s stay, the CID questioned him twice. At one point, Mr Najeeb became sick and was moved to camp 8 to recover. The officer in charge of camp 8 was named Torres. "He treated us gently and with kindness," Mr. Najeeb said. In camp 8 prisoners could talk to each other.

Both the military intelligence and CID questioned Mr. Najeeb many times. During one interrogation, the translator, a Kuwaiti man, asked the interrogator why soldiers treat prisoners poorly. He said it was to discipline them. On June 10, a U.S. interrogator questioned Mr. Najeeb for four hours. In the interrogation, the translator told Mr. Najeeb he would be released soon. The interrogator asked Mr. Najeeb if anyone had beaten him during his detention. Mr. Najeeb told the interrogator his entire story. The interrogator was disturbed; the translator said he wanted to cry. The interrogator went to his superior to tell him about the abuse. The superior came back to see Mr. Najeeb. He asked Mr. Najeeb if these beatings surprised him, and said the British do worse things to their detainees. After this interrogation, guards put Mr. Najeeb back into the tent where detainees could not talk to each other. He spent two days there before guards returned him to camp 8. Mr. Najeeb feels he was being punished for speaking about his mistreatment, because he was not released until Thursday, July 3, 2003.

Mr. Najeeb returned home on July 4. On July 9, U.S. soldiers raided and searched his home. He was not there at the time, but returned an hour later. The secretary for the governor’s office called Mr. Najeeb and told him the Army wanted him to sign some release documents. They wanted to come to his home. Mr. Najeeb said they could not come to his home; he would go to their base at Kerbala University. At the base, he once more saw the officer named Brown who had questioned him before. Brown asked for Mr. Najeeb’s release paper (signed by Colonel Alan Ecke at Camp Commandant), tore it up, and tied Mr. Najeeb’s hands behind his back. He said Mr. Najeeb had been released by mistake. Soldiers took him back to Lima camp for four hours before they took him to the Al Diwaniah province once more. There they took him to an open-air cell where he stayed for two days. During that time, he became sick. [From his description of the sickness, it seems he was dehydrated.] The U.S. guards did not give him food or water him there. Iraqi police gave him two loaves of bread each day and some salad. With money the prison let him keep, he was able to buy some food from a stand the police ran. When he had to go to the bathroom, he had to use a corner of the cell.

At the end of two days, Mr. Najeeb had a heart attack. Guards moved him to the cardiac ward of a public hospital where he stayed 40 days. During that time, he continued to suffer angina attacks. For six days, he went on a hunger and medication fast to protest his treatment. By now his case had become well known to many human rights groups, politicians, and individuals who were working hard to release him and had hired a lawyer. As a result, Coalition Forces guarded Mr. Najeeb closely and prevented anyone from talking to him.

A team of doctors from Ibn Sina hospital, in the Green Zone and a U.S. appointed investigator came down from Baghdad to review Mr. Najeeb’s status. Physicians in Al Diwaniah said his condition was not stable and he should not be moved. The next day the people from Baghdad brought him anyway to a transfer center in Al Diwaniah. They stated to his family and friends that he could receive better care at Ibn Sina hospital in Baghdad. After a couple of days, they took him by helicopter to the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) detention facility. He spent seven days there. In interrogation there, two U.S. soldiers twisted his arm behind him, shoved him to the ground and against the wall. A female doctor took away all his medication, including his nitroglycerin, and she spit in his face. He said they also put him on the black list as number 52. An Iraqi doctor took care of him for the duration of his stay.

At the end of his seven days at BIAP, soldiers flew Mr. Najeeb in a helicopter to Abu Ghraib prison. They placed him in the heavy security section. He said he was in camp Delta, because there was a hospital there. The medics allowed him only one pill a day for his hypertension. When he asked about the rest of his pills, the doctor told him to drink more water. One day he suffered from a stroke and lost the use of the left side of his body for an hour before a doctor gave him a shot that restored usage. Three hours later, he suffered another heart attack.

Guards took Mr. Najeeb to the hospital ward where a compassionate doctor called Dr. Jasy looked after him. Mr. Najeed’s condition moved Dr. Jasy, who at one point broke down in tears and hugged Mr. Najeeb. "May God bless him, he was so noble and so kind. When I saw him I saw my son," Mr. Najeeb said about Dr. Jasy. When Dr. Jasy transferred Mr. Najeeb to Ibn Sina hospital, he escorted him to the helicopter to see him off.

At Ibn Sina hospital the treatment was poor and the security harsh. Guards tied Mr. Najeeb’s right hand and left foot to his bed, making it hard for him to eat. Nurses gave him a bedpan to urinate in, and when he had to use the toilet, a female U.S. nurse escorted him to the bathroom and made him leave the door open. Mr. Najeeb said the treatment was so bad, after two days he insisted they return him to Abu Ghraib.

In Abu Ghraib, Mr. Najeeb was placed in a camp run but a sergeant named Tony. Sgt. Tony often punished everyone for the mistake of one prisoner. For example, he would take away the cigarette rations from all prisoners for several days because someone had done something wrong. They could shower for only three minutes every ten days. Mr. Najeeb fell sick once more, so guards transferred him to camp Delta within Abu Ghraib. There he saw Dr. Jasy again. Dr. Jasy treated him well. He gave him extra cigarettes and called him "my father Najeeb."

Some time between October 10 and 15, 2003, CBS television interviewed Mr. Najeeb’s son about Mr. Najeeb, and then met with Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, the then-head of Abu Ghraib prison. In the interview with BG Karpinski, CBS asked her how long the Coalition Forces held detainees before deciding if they were innocent or guilty. She replied that they are held for only 72 hours. CBS then asked her to look up a number and gave her Mr. Najeeb’s. She typed it into the computer, but when the file came up on the screen, she covered it up with her hand so the camera could not see it. CBS later gave Mr. Najeeb’s family footage of this interview. At that time, interrogators at Abu Ghraib informed Mr. Najeeb and those working for his release that they did not have any incriminating evidence against him and that his release depended on the Kerbala police. The CBS interview with BG Karpinski aired in the U.S. on December 24, 2003. On December 27, Dr. Jasy came to tell Mr. Najeeb the prison would release him the next day. On December 28, the Coalition Forces released Mr. Najeeb.

2. Testimony of Hythem

C.P.T. received permission to use the following testimony provided real names were not used. Consequently, all names have been changed.

On July 2, 2003, at 2:30 am, Hythem, his wife, his three-year-old son, his sixty-five year old mother and his two brothers Bahr and Mohammed were sleeping when the Coalition Forces blew open his front door. Hythem awoke at the explosion and opened the window to look out. He said he saw about 80 soldiers around his house, while two helicopters hovered overhead. At that time, a soldier threw a sound grenade through the window. With his son in his arms, he left the room. Four soldiers had entered the house. The soldiers knocked his mother and wife to the ground, and pushed his son to his mother. The soldiers yelled and swore at everyone, telling them to keep their heads down. "When I tried to talk to them, the soldiers told me to ’shut up,’" recalled Hythem.

Because it was a hot night, Bahr and Mohammed had been sleeping on the roof. Hythem said soldiers came down out of the helicopters and detained his brothers. He saw the soldiers come down from the roof with Bahr and Mohammed hooded and their hands behind their backs. All the soldiers wore camouflage make-up and night goggles. The soldiers then hooded Hythem and tied his hands behind his back. Hythem said it was hot under the hood.

Hythem and his brothers were in their underwear. The soldiers took the women and Hythem’s son into the kitchen. Hythem heard his wife say in English to a soldier, "We are women, there is no need to point your gun at us. Put your weapon down." At this time, Hythem said soldiers made him and his brothers kneel and face a wall. Through a translator, one by one, the soldiers turned them around with a flashlight in their faces, and asked, "Where are the missiles?" When Hythem and his brothers said they knew nothing about missiles, the translator called them liars. During this time, Hythem said, they heard explosions going on throughout the house. Four months later, when Hythem’s wife visited him in prison, he learned that the soldiers had blown out all the doors in the house.

Soldiers made Hythem and his brother’s stand up and took them out of the house. Hythem said the soldiers walked them through the house and smashed them back and forth against the walls. They put Hythem on the floor of a vehicle and put his brothers on top of him. Then soldiers stepped on them. Hythem’s brothers took the worst of this, but one soldier stepped on Hythem’s head. From inside the house, Hythem heard shooting. This scared him because his family was still inside. While he was in prison, he worried over this until his family visited him in jail and told him they had heard the shooting too, but never found out what it was.

The vehicle moved shortly after soldiers placed them inside. They stopped many times as they moved, but Hythem was not sure why. He did not know it at the time, but he and his brothers were being taken to Baghdad International Airport (BIAP).

At BIAP, some people took Hythem and his brothers out of the vehicle and put them on the ground. The people beat them all over with the butts of their guns. They forced one of Hythem’s brothers to put his legs on Hythem’s lap from behind. The people laughed and made fun of Hythem and his brothers, swearing and saying, "Shut up." One person yelled an order at Hythem’s brother saying, "Fuck your brother." Hythem said his brother responded by saying in Arabic, "There is no god but Allah, and Mohammed is his prophet." Hythem and his other brother joined him in saying this. Throughout this, Hythem said he could see the flash of cameras through the hood over his head. Hythem said one person then urinated on him and his brothers. Hythem and his brother were still linked when all three of them were put in a hole, and had dust thrown on them. He did not know what kind of dust it was, but said it smelled bad. Throughout this the laughter and flashes continued. Hythem said one person punched him, choked him and put a finger above his collarbone and pressed. "Do you want to kill our soldiers?" the person asked. Hythem then passed out due to the pain. Hythem learned later from his brother that someone had dragged them apart and woken Hythem by slapping him in the face several times.

After Hythem regained consciousness, someone said to him, "I want to help you. Come with me." The man led Hythem away. In an office, Hythem had his hood removed, but his hands remained behind his back. He was with what he described as an old U.S. man who spoke Arabic and wore a uniform. The old man said, "Help us help you." There was another younger soldier there who asked questions in English and the old man translated. Hythem told him to loosen his hands. The young soldier asked a third soldier to test Hythem’s fingernails to see if there was any blood in his fingers. There was none, so he untied Hythem’s hands. They gave Hythem an undershirt with a piece of paper pinned on the front. Hythem noted the paper said, "Attack against Coalition Forces." The young soldier then asked Hythem questions through the old man. They asked if he knew fedayeen [loyalists to Saddam Hussein], what kind of newspaper he read, what he did for work. "These questions do not fit with the way you attacked my home," Hythem replied. "If you asked me these questions before, I’ll tell you anything you want. There’s no need to attack my home that way. I think Saddam Hussein was in my home by the way of attack."

When the soldiers finished questioning Hythem, they tied his hands behind his back again, and took him to a small room made of razor wire. The room was three meters by three meters. Half an hour later soldiers brought his brothers in. The three of them remained there for three hours before, one by one, soldiers untied their hands, gave them water and took them to the computer center where Hythem and his brothers received bracelets with their tag numbers. Soldiers then took them to a camp where other detainees were imprisoned. They spent one night in this camp. The next day, along with 17 others, soldiers tied them two by two, one foot and one hand together, and put them on a bus. The soldiers drove them to a cargo plane and put them on.

Hythem said the flight was approximately an hour long. During this time, Iraqis asked the guards on the plane where they were going, but the guards did not answer. When they left the plane, Hythem read a sign that they were at the Basrah airport. Hythem also said he and his brothers did not have any shoes on and the tarmac was hot. Guards put them on a bus and the bus took them to the detention camp at Um Qasr.

In Um Qasr, Hythem and his brothers received blue coveralls to wear and slept in the same tent. Hythem said the food and water at Um Qasr were bad. A doctor would see only 20 to 30 prisoners out of 600 every two days. Hythem said he saw the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Um Qasr. He gave them a letter to give to his family. The person from the ICRC apologized for not coming sooner but said the ICRC was keeping a low profile in Iraq due to the bombing of their office in Baghdad earlier in the year.

On October 24, Hythem’s wife visited him. Because each prisoner could visit with only one family member, one of Hythem’s brothers’ own wife visited him, and their mother visited the third brother, who is unmarried. From his wife Hythem learned about what soldiers had done in his house the night they captured him. His wife told him she did not know what the shooting was about, but soldiers had broken everything, torn up clothes, cut open handbags and taken some money. Hythem asked his family to get a lawyer, but later a translator for the prison told him that no one could help him, not even a lawyer. The visits he and his brothers had with their family lasted fifteen minutes.

Soldiers or guards never interrogated Hythem in Um Qasr but sometime in the course of his stay, he said they made him sign a paper that said he gave up his human rights under the Geneva Conventions. The paper was in English, Hythem said. The translator who explained it told him the prison would not release him if he did not sign it. The translator, who wore a military uniform, said signing the paper was the beginning of his release process. Hythem signed the paper because he wanted to be released.

On November 17, the U.S. forces transferred Hythem and his brothers to the Abu Ghraib detention facility. Guards put him and his brothers in the same tent again. Hythem said they were in camp 7, with a sign over the entrance that read "Welcome to the hotel California." He said Abu Ghraib was harder than Um Qasr. There were 12 camps there. Each camp had 20 tents with 20 people in each. Under winter conditions the ground in the camps was muddy and the blue coveralls he wore were made of nylon and did not keep him warm. "The lives of prisoners are not safe in the prison," Hythem said. The night before the Eid [feast] at the end of Ramadan in December, the Iraqis in the camps began to chant "There is no god but Allah, and Mohammed is his prophet," as is the custom at the end of Ramadan. This startled the guards at the camps and they opened fire on the detainees. The guards killed seven Iraqis that night. One man, near Hythem, was shot in the head.

In Abu Ghraib, Hythem said he was forced once more to sign a piece of paper that stated he had given up his human rights under the Geneva Conventions. Again, a translator told him the prison would not release him if he did not sign the paper and that doing so was the beginning of his release process.

On February 7, 2004, Abu Ghraib finally released Hythem and his brothers. Hythem said it happened fast. "Guards took us to a room to process us, then straight to the lorry." The lorry drove him and several other detainees in the direction of Fallujah, opposite from that of Baghdad. After ten kilometers, the lorry pulled over at a park and let everyone out. Hythem said several cars with Iraqis waiting for loved ones to be released followed the lorry from the prison and that he and his brothers got a ride home in one of these cars.

Hythem said he did not want to talk to press, and did not feel comfortable if his name was used because he fears the U.S. will find him and detain him again based on his testimony.

3.Testimony of Hisham

C.P.T. received permission to use the following testimony provided real names were not used. Consequently, all names have been changed.

On Tuesday, August 26, 2003, Hisham, his uncle Ghazi, four men from Iran, and the Iraqi driver of the car they rented were on their way from Kerbala to visit shrines in Samarra, a town north of Baghdad. Ghazi, originally from Iraq, had fled from Saddam to Iran many years before. He had not been to the shrines for years. Hisham pointed out that it was normal for Shi’a Muslims to visit the holy shrines in Najaf, Kerbala, and Samarra.

On the outskirts of Samarra, as they crossed a bridge, they stopped to take video footage of the good view of the city with the shrines and nearby river. Beyond their position on the bridge was a U.S. Army checkpoint. Cars were passing through it but the soldiers stopped their car and ordered them to turn off the engine and get out of the car. Soldiers searched the car and found two cameras: the video camera and a still camera. Soldiers took the video camera to a tank at the checkpoint and had one of the soldiers in the tank watch the footage to see if there was anything on it that compromised security. Hisham and his friends waited for about an hour and fifteen minutes in the sun while the soldier went through the tape. Hisham said it was about a two-hour tape.

Hisham speaks some English, and he told the soldiers that he and his friends had just been taping the shrines and landscape. He told the soldiers to keep the tape or even to keep both the cameras, but please just to let them go.

When the soldiers finished with the tape, two humvees with U.S. and Iraqi soldiers came to the checkpoint. Soldiers tied the hands of Hisham, his uncle and his friends behind their behind their backs, and put them back in their car. Escorted between the two humvees, an Iraqi drove them and their car to a local military base. While they drove, they asked the Iraqi what would happen to them. He told them not to worry; the U.S. Army would hold them twenty to thirty days and then release them. The owner of the car asked what would happen to his car. The Iraqi said the Army would take care of it.

At the local base (a police station occupied by U.S. soldiers), U.S. soldiers made them stand and face a wall for half an hour. A U.S. officer then took them for questioning one by one. When Hisham went, the officer had an Arabic translator, but Hisham was not sure where the translator was from (he guessed Lebanon or Egypt). There was a female U.S. soldier taking notes. The questions were standard questions: name, age, what are you doing in the area, who are you with, did you work for the old regime? Hisham told them he was a student, and not old enough to work for the old regime or to be in the Army yet. The female officer measured his height, and searched him. She took all his belongings (prayer beads, wristwatch, keys, money, and I.D.), put them in a bag, and wrote his name on it. A tall soldier then took Hisham by the collar and led him "the long way" to a prison cell in an adjacent room. Hisham said, "I knew there was an easy way through a door, but he took me in complicated ways to confuse me."

This base had many cells, each with many Iraqi citizens in them. Soldiers placed Hisham in a cell with two others from his group. Three additional Iraqi people were in the cell with them. Hisham asked the two from his group what had happened to them, and they described a similar routine of questioning. When the questioning was done, soldiers gathered all seven of the men together in one cell, along with the three other Iraqis who had been there for twenty to thirty days. Soldiers fed them that night at around 6:00 pm. Because they did not recognize anything in the meal packet, they ate only the biscuits and jam.

Reflecting on this experience, Hisham said, "These were very hard times for us. We suffered from terror and fear – it was the first time we had been in a situation like this. We were afraid especially because we did not know the reason for our being here. There was no one to help us. We tried our best to cooperate, and we asked questions about why were here. But they would just say, ‘Shut up! Shut up!’ And if we repeated our question, they got upset and very angry."

The next afternoon (Wednesday 27) at 12:00 pm, the same officer from the previous day had them all brought to his desk. For half an hour, he said nothing but looked them up and down. They asked him if they would go home. He said, "Maybe." At the end of half an hour, the officer and some other soldiers talked about what they should do with Hisham and his friends. Through his limited English, Hisham understood the soldiers wanted to move them. Several soldiers came with rope and tied the detainees’ hands behind their backs, searched their pockets again, lined them up and shouted at them to go out to a truck outside.

Soldiers took Hisham and the others in a covered truck to another U.S. base. Hisham did not know what base it was or where they were. He said that they were then taken on a 10-minute drive along a dusty road. Hisham and his friends then sat in the truck for an hour. They were shaded from the sun but still hot. They asked one of the U.S. soldiers guarding them what would happen to them. He said that at 5:00 pm they would be taken to Guantanamo Bay. Concerned, Hisham asked the guard if he was sure. Hisham then asked the other guard who said the same thing. At 5:00 pm, the truck drove to a helicopter pad. The two guards placed them in the helicopter and got in themselves. When he saw the guards putting on seatbelts, Hisham asked for seatbelts too, but the guards refused. The flight took about fifteen minutes. While they flew, one soldier asked Hisham to look out the window and commented on the beautiful scenery below. After a while, the guard told Hisham not to look out the window any more.

When the helicopter landed, the guards placed them in another truck, drove them to a location and took them out. The guards placed them on their knees and left them there for three hours. Hisham and his friends kept asking where they were. They only learned only later, from other prisoners, that they were in Abu Ghraib.

They spent the night in a tent with four guards. In the morning, guards took them one by one to be processed in an office full of computers. They had their eyes scanned. They were given I.D. bracelets, and the Iranians were hooded. They were all questioned. Guards put Hisham and the Iraqi driver in a tent in a heavy security camp for supporters of Saddam. Four days later, Hisham’ uncle and the Iranians joined them in the tent. They said they had each spent the four days in one-meter by one-meter cells.

The six men spent an additional twenty days in heavy security before prison guards moved them to a light security camp for criminal detainees. Hisham does not know the name of either of the camps in which he was placed. They were detained for a total of 3 months and 2 weeks.

Guards told Hisham and his friends they were being held because they videotaped Coalition Forces when they had been filming the city of Samarra from the bridge. While in Abu Ghraib, none of them were beaten or verbally abused while detained. They did not witness anyone being beaten or abused either, although they did talk to people who claimed to have been beaten and saw many bruises and injuries. Hisham said, "We could see signs of torture on other detainees – black eyes and bruised legs." One man they talked to said he had been bitten in the thigh by a security dog. Another man said guards hung him from the ceiling for several days until his shoulders were dislocated. Hisham also said the camps had "Tarzans," detainees who had been captured in their underwear in house raids and not given additional clothing to wear.

Guards gave detainees two meals per day. At first the food was from the U.S. Sometime during Hisham’s stay, the prison changed food contractors to an Iraqi company who served them Iraqi food, which Hisham said was of poor quality. During Ramadan, Hisham said that the prison shifted the times for meals to accommodate the fast.

Hisham and his friends never received visits from family. He said his family did not know where he was until he was moved into the light security camp. He was able to send his family a letter through the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), but he saw the ICRC only once. They came one morning from 8:00 am to 12:00 pm, and took cases from detainees, including Hisham.

On Friday, December 10, 2003, prison guards called the numbers of detainees to be released. Hisham heard their numbers called. It took guards five hours to process them for release. The prison gave back personal belongings taken away from detainees when they entered Abu Ghraib, but because their belongings had been taken from them at the base near Samarra, they did not get anything back. This included money and the cameras. The driver did eventually get his car back, as his family from Kerbala picked up the car a month after the group was arrested.

Hisham gave C.P.T. permission to publish his story, but he does not want to use his real name. He is afraid that if he publicizes his story, the Coalition Forces will detain him again.

ABOUT CHRISTIAN PEACEMAKER TEAMS

Christian Peacemaker Teams (C.P.T.) is an independent, faith-based, violence-reduction project, sponsored and supported by Christian churches across North America, especially by Mennonite, Brethren and Quaker denominations. C.P.T. has placed violence-reduction teams and/or delegations in the following locations since its genesis in 1988: Hebron, Palestine; Chiapas, Mexico; Colombia; New Brunswick and Ontario, Canada; South Dakota, Virginia, Washington, D.C. and New York, USA; Puerto Rico; Bosnia; Haiti; Afghanistan; and Iraq. C.P.T.’s violence-reduction work around the world is based on members’ Christian faith, inspired by Jesus of Nazareth’s example, as well as by other leaders, such as Gandhi, Badsha Khan, Martin Luther King, Jr. and peacemakers from other religions and traditions.

Christian Peacemaker Teams
PO Box 6508, Chicago, IL 60680, USA
Tel: 773-277-0253; Fax: 773-277-0291
E-mail: peacemakers@cpt.org; Web: www.cpt.org
Appendix I: Detention Context

On March 19, 2003, a coalition of nations led by the U.S. began a campaign to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. After the fall of Saddam’s regime on April 9, 2003, this coalition created the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to govern Iraq until they could establish a new Iraqi government. During the major military operations (March 19 to May 1, 2003), the Coalition Forces (CF)-the U.S.-commanded military arm of the Coalition-captured thousands of Iraqis. Some were members of opposition forces and duly classified as prisoners of war. Some were common citizens, labeled civilian internees, whom the CF determined they needed to capture in order to conduct their operations. For many others, the CF captured them under the suspicion that they were involved with opposition forces, resistance groups, foreign terrorist groups, or the former regime, and gave them the label "security detainees" (or "security internees").

In order to accommodate all of these captives, the CF created makeshift detention camps, some of which they adapted from existing Iraqi facilities, and many of which they built new. The CF have since released most (if not all) of the civilian internees and prisoners of war captured during the major military operations. However, as the sole governing body in Iraq for several months after Saddam Hussein’s regime fell, the CPA acquired responsibility for criminals incarcerated at all levels in Iraq’s penal system. In July 2003, the CPA appointed the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) to take on some responsibilities in governing Iraq, including in the criminal justice system.

Between May 2003 and October 2003, the CF held several thousand detainees in a variety of locations throughout Iraq. At that time, C.P.T. members discovered that the CF held most of the security detainees at Camp Bucca, just outside of Umm Qasr on the Persian Gulf, and at Camp Cropper inside the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP). The CF only permitted family visitations at a few facilities, including Camp Bucca. According to CPA officials, they prohibited detainees from receiving legal counsel at all facilities as a matter of policy because they believed allowing legal counsel could compromise security. In November 2003, the CF began consolidating most of the security detainees into camps inside the Abu Ghraib prison compound, just west of Baghdad. The CF denied detainees access to legal counsel at Abu Ghraib as well, and family visitations there were scant until February 2003.

In May 2004, C.P.T. members obtained a document from a CPA official summarizing all registered detainees held by the CF in Iraq. The document showed that at the time, they held 4,187 detainees in Abu Ghraib, 2,380 in Camp Bucca, 92 at BIAP, and 1,090 at several small bases across Iraq. The document further showed that as of May 2004, the CF had at one time or another detained 38,494 persons in Iraq.

On June 28, 2004, the Coalition’s occupation of Iraq formally ended. The CPA and IGC dissolved, relinquishing sovereignty of Iraq to the Interim Government of Iraq (IGI). Amidst this transition, the CF restructured to become the Multinational Force (MNF). The IGI officially charged the MNF with the duty of maintaining security and stability in Iraq by all means necessary. The IGI explicitly stated that the MNF may detain any persons they deem necessary for imperative reasons of security.

Between the cessation of major military operations and the transfer of sovereignty to the IGI, the CPA employed thousands of Iraqi policemen and dozens of Iraqi judges to manage the bulk of Iraqi criminal cases. By May 2004, the IGC was managing the criminal justice system almost independently. Then, on June 28, 2004, the new Iraqi Ministry of Justice took official control over the Iraqi criminal justice system, with operational support provided by the MNF. However, the MNF continued in the former CF’s role as managers of security at all detention and prison facilities.

Since the transfer of sovereignty to the IGI, the MNF has reportedly moved most security detainees to Camp Bucca.2 The MNF holds High Value Detainees (HVDs)-i.e. detainees suspected of posing the greatest threat to security or of knowing the most valuable information-at Camp Cropper, as did the CF previously.3

At present, the MNF continues to capture and detain persons indefinitely whom they suspect pose an imperative threat to security. On August 29, 2004, MNF officials said, "The multinational force currently detains about 5,300 people for security reasons."4

In an August 16, 2004 press release, the MNF Detainee Operations Public Affairs Office reported that the MNF only recently expanded its confidential Combined Review and Release Board (CRRB) to include six commissioners from the IGI.5 Now, the CRRB consists of nine members: three top-ranking U.S. military commanders-a legal expert, a military police representative, and a military intelligence representative-and six IGI commissioners-two from each of the IGI’s Ministries of Justice, Interior, and Human Rights. It is still presided over by a U.S. military official. All of the thousands of security detainee cases must be funneled through this board, which meets three days a week. In addition, U.S. Army Major General Geoffrey Miller, the Deputy Commanding General for Detainee Operations for the MNF, reserves the right to veto any decision to release a detainee the CRRB makes.

The stated goal of the board is to review each detainee’s case every three months. Upon deciding to continue to hold a detainee, the board may or may not issue formal charges. As of August 29, the board had already reviewed 300 cases, and plans to consider another 3,700 "eligible" security detainees in the upcoming weeks. Upon deciding to continue to hold a detainee, the board may or may not issue formal charges. The MNF’s latest policy on allowing detainees legal council is unknown.
Appendix II: C.P.T.’s Work in Iraq

Christian Peacemaker Teams (C.P.T.) has maintained a violence-reduction presence in Iraq since October 2002. The Iraq team’s activities have included:

• Providing on-the-ground information to decision-makers and the media pre-invasion
• Seeking to protect vital civil infrastructure facilities during the invasion in March and April 2003
• Observing and documenting the Coalition’s post-invasion activities and consequential damages during the war and the following occupation
• Supporting non-violent efforts of local Iraqis for justice and peace
• Working to open lines of communication between Iraqi human rights workers and Coalition representatives
• Documenting cases of persons detained by the Coalition Forces (CF) or the Multinational Force (MNF) in Iraq
• Advocating for just and humane treatment of persons the CF/MNF have detained and the family members of these detainees
• Campaigning for changes in or development of CF/MNF’s policies which threaten the safety of CF/MNF soldiers, contracted workers, international aid workers, and Iraqi civilians

C.P.T.’S WORK ON DETAINEES

C.P.T. first became involved with detainee issues in May of 2003 when Iraqis came to C.P.T. members asking for help in finding information about their detained relatives. Working on their behalf, C.P.T. members found it extremely difficult to obtain accurate information about detainees. After pressing military officers at the Coalition’s Iraqi Assistance Center (IAC) in Baghdad, C.P.T. members were able to obtain limited information on the location of a few detainees. The families were relieved to know their relatives were alive and relatively safe. Some family members were able to visit their relatives in the CF detention camps.

During this process, C.P.T. recognized that hundreds of detainees’ family members were frantically trying to get information about their relatives. Literally crying out for attention, families crowded at the concrete barriers and barb-wired gates of the various Civil Military Operations Centers (CMOC), where some CF detention camps were located. Families attempted to visit the IAC, which had several armed checkpoints that significantly limited accessibility for Iraqis. Families also appealed to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and local human rights groups for assistance. With almost no communication between the CPA or the CF and civilian Iraqis, the gravity of the problem was clear. Family members were furious or devastated when they failed to find information, calling down curses on the Coalition and equating it with Saddam’s regime.

In early summer in 2003, C.P.T. members devoted significant effort to assisting families of detainees and investigating the CF’s process for capturing, detaining and reviewing persons accused of crimes against the Coalition. By the middle of September 2003, C.P.T. had taken on dozens of cases and was devoting the majority of its resources to issues relating to detainees.

C.P.T. worked on these cases for months, visiting several different U.S. military bases and CMOCs, contacting a variety of CPA officials, and accompanying families as they sought information about and justice for their detained relatives. In the process, C.P.T. members documented their actions and took testimonies from families of detainees and detainees themselves once the CF released them. In January 2004, C.P.T. published a report summarizing its work with 72 detainees, drawing conclusions about the problematic trends in the CF’s detention system, and providing recommendations to the CF, the CPA and the U.S. government on how to improve the system. C.P.T. disseminated this report to CPA and CF officials, U.S. legislators, U.N. officials, Iraqi non-government organizations (NGOs), other international NGOs, international media, church groups in North America, and many others.

By the end of winter 2004, C.P.T. members encountered many roadblocks as they attempted to influence the CPA and CF for positive change in the detention system. CPA officials often cancelled meetings with C.P.T. members and their Iraqi partners, and CF officers often stated that they were unable to change the policies that directed the detention system. Consequently, C.P.T. began to work for justice for Iraqi detainees from new angles.

C.P.T. launched the Adopt-a-Detainee Campaign in February 2004. This campaign paired groups around the world-primarily church groups in North America-with individual Iraqi detainees. These groups wrote letters to CPA and CF officials and U.S. legislators to get answers on detainees’ status and appeal for justice.

Beginning in concurrence with the letter-writing campaign, C.P.T. members in Iraq held a public vigil for justice and healing for Iraqi detainees during the season of Lent. C.P.T. also invited people of faith in North America to hold similar vigils and demonstrations. These actions drew a significant amount of media attention, which C.P.T. used to raise awareness about the problematic trends outlined in the January report.

Throughout the spring and summer of 2004, C.P.T. members in Iraq attempted to follow up on all of the 72 cases from the January report. C.P.T. members also took several testimonies from released detainees and detainees’ families not included in the January report. Based on these investigations, C.P.T. published a situation report on Iraqi detainees in July 2004. The situation report described how the problematic trends outlined in the January report had continued, with only a few improvements.

By the end of August 2004, C.P.T. finished its follow-up work on the original 72 de