by Phyllis Bennis
Institute For Policy Studies
April 11, 2004

Almost one year from President Bush’s announcement of the end of “major combat operations” in Iraq, the U.S. drive towards empire faces new and serious challenges. One year to the day since U.S. military forces pulled down the statue of Saddam Hussein, the front page of the Washington Post features a photograph of another U.S. soldier pulling down a poster of Shia’a cleric Moqtada al-Sadr from a pillar in the same Baghdad square. Certainly the most important challenge is seen in the widening military confrontation now facing U.S. troops in cities across Iraq. But there is a further challenge internationally. The “second super-power” is on the rise, and it now has broadened to include not only social movements and global civil society protests but as well a new assortment of governments prepared to defy U.S. pressures, inter-governmental organizations and groups (some of them newly formed, such as the G-21). And new developments may point to a potential to reclaim the United Nations itself as part of the global resistance to U.S. war.

The bottom line is that it has become impossible for the Bush administration to claim that their policies are good for Iraqis or good for Americans. The key weaknesses facing the administration’s policies start with exposés – from lies regarding weapons of mass destruction to the failure of an Iraq-obsessed White House to take real terrorist threats seriously. The specific vulnerabilities reflect the specific false claims the administration has been using (some of them now being discarded) to actually brag about the “success” of their strategy.

“We have liberated Iraq from tyranny.” What Iraqis see outside their doors are foreign soldiers occupying their country. Violence is escalating on a scale unprecedented inside Iraq since the Iran-Iraq War and the Anfal campaign of the 1980s. Many Iraqis, particularly many women, are afraid to leave their homes becomes of the surging violence.

THE ASSASSINATION OF SHEIK YASSIN AND ISRAEL’S PUSH FOR U.S. SUPPORT OF ANNEXATION OF SETTLEMENTS

by Phyllis Bennis
Institute for Policy Studies
29 March 2004

The assassination of Sheik Ahmed Yassin marks a serious escalation in Israeli occupation tactics. While Israel had (in earlier assassination attempts) already crossed the “red line” that once defined some limits in aggressive acts, its message in the Yassin murder was that there are no limits, that Israel’s military attacks face no restrictions. Counting accurately on Washington’s unwillingness to challenge its aggression, the assassination also ushers in a new Israeli campaign to win official U.S. support for wide-spread annexation of major West Bank settlements as part of Tel Aviv’s “unilateral withdrawal from Gaza” plan.

“Targeted assassination” is murder; it stands in clear violation of international law. The Israeli action and the U.S. refusal to condemn it make a mockery of international law. Killing is an absolute prohibition; international law does not allow exceptions for “ticking bombs,” or anything else. Article 3(I) of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 “prohibits at any time and in any place” (a) “violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds” and (d) “the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized people.” In the case of Sheik Yassin, the Israeli claim that he was responsible for earlier suicide attacks (which, when they target civilians, are indeed a violation of international law) does not provide legal justification. Those who claim that Sheik Yassin does not merit protection under the Fourth Geneva Convention because he supported suicide bombings should note that “protected persons” are identified as those “taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces … placed hors de combat [out of combat] by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause.” It is hard to imagine a clearer example of someone “out of combat by sickness” than a 67-year-old quadriplegic cleric, wheelchair-bound, largely deaf and mostly blind.

The assassination has been condemned by the United Nations, the European Union, and virtually every government in the world with the exception of the United States.

Phyllis Bennis
Institute for Policy Studies
16 March 2004 - Anniversary of the Murder of Rachel Corrie

The signing of the interim Iraqi “constitution” by the Governing Council represents a significant step in U.S. efforts to legitimize its invasion and occupation of Iraq. By achieving the codification in a U.S.-supervised process of an ostensibly “Iraqi” legal document, the U.S. as occupying power is hoping that its planned June 30th “transfer of power” will be accepted globally as the “restoration of sovereignty to Iraq.” In fact, that “transfer of power” will not end the U.S. occupation, will not lead to the withdrawal of U.S. troops, and will not result in any real sovereignty for Iraq. The constitution itself implies recognition of its impotence, as it recognizes that all “laws, regulations, orders, and directives” issued by the U.S. occupation authorities will remain in force.

The new Iraqi constitution lacks legitimacy. It was drafted under U.S. supervision by a body hand-chosen by the U.S. military occupation authorities, and subject to final approval by the U.S. proconsul, Paul Bremer. Its acceptance by the Iraqi population remains uncertain; its ability to actually set the terms for laws to govern the country during the interim period after June 30 remains unknown; its relevance to any truly independent government created after the interim period remains in doubt. As a result, any examination of the Constitution must include its legitimacy/illegitimacy, as well as the content of its provisions.

The constitution describes only a vague process to select the new transitional government to which the U.S. will “transfer power” on June 30th. It is to be chosen through “a process of extensive deliberations and consultations with cross-sections of the Iraqi people conducted by the Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority and possibly in consultation with the United Nations.” No method of conducting such “extensive deliberations” is included, and given the Governing Council’s failure so far to have engaged in serious wide-ranging consultations with Iraqi society regarding their own governance, it is unlikely to change any time soon. Crucially, the mandated “consultations” are to be conducted equally between the existing U.S.-appointed Governing Council and the U.S. occupation authority itself - thus insuring that the Governing Council will remain either fully in place or with a self-selected successor body to replace it. The role of the UN is dismissed as “perhaps” being included in consultations.

The Iraq Governing Council holds on to power. Since the constitution says nothing about how the interim government will actually be selected, the unspoken understanding is that the Governing Council -perhaps enlarged by additional U.S.-selected individuals, perhaps in its current form-will remain the center of Iraqi authority. Many current members of the Council have made clear their desire to hold on to power, knowing that (since most of them spent the last decade or two or three outside of Iraq) they would be unlikely to win any kind of election. As a result, the United Nations and others have suggested that the interim government operate with a very narrow mandate - essentially “keeping the lights on and paying the bills of the street-sweepers.” Specifically, the suggestion was that the interim government make no decisions regarding major economic or foreign policy issues. However, the constitution as drafted provides no limits on what issues the interim government, in whatever form it takes, may decide - including continuing the U.S.-initiated privatization policies, negotiating major replacement oil contracts, and most significantly signing a Status of Forces Agreement with the U.S. to provide an Iraqi “invitation” to the 100,000+ U.S. troops who will remain in Iraq.

by Phyllis Bennis
Institute for Policy Studies

The U.S. is eager for the UN to return to Iraq to provide political cover for its occupation. The quagmire on the ground in Iraq plus recognition that the rest of the world, and most Iraqis themselves, reject Washington’s claim of legitimacy is the basis for the Bush administration reversing its earlier anti-UN positions to beg the international organization for help.

Kofi Annan’s decision to send a technical investigative team to Iraq is partly in response to mounting pressure from the U.S., but also a response to shifting sentiments among Iraqis, particularly the call from Ayatollah al-Sistani for a UN assessment of political conditions. While Annan’s announcement indicated he was responding to the request of the U.S. occupation authorities and its hand-picked “governing council” to determine whether elections could be held by Washington’s June 30th deadline, he left open the possibility of a broader definition of “what alternative arrangement would be acceptable” if not.

WHY IS THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION SO SET ON A JUNE 30TH “HANDOVER OF POWER TO IRAQIS”?

by Phyllis Bennis
Institute for Policy Studies
21 January 2004

• Bush’s speech was about politics not policies, driven by electoral concerns. It reflected a far-right agenda designed to appeal to the wealthy and social conservatives with “faith-based initiatives,” gay marriage, drugs in sports, abstinence.
• Bush’s policies - both domestic and international - are STILL reckless, unsafe, unfair.
• Bush continues to rely on ratcheting up the fear factor - fear is a key component in Bush’s plan to gain support for the 2004 election.

The speech was characterized by serious omissions, denials, and lies.

WHAT’S MISSING?